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In May 2017, my book ‘Conversations on Art and Aesthetics’ 
appeared. It contains conversations with, and photographic portraits 
of, ten prominent philosophers of art. They are Noël Carroll, Gregory 
Currie, Arthur Danto, Cynthia Freeland, Paul Guyer, Carolyn 
Korsmeyer, Jerrold Levinson, Jenefer Robinson, Roger Scruton, and 
Kendall Walton. The book has two main aims. One is to provide a 
broad and accessible overview of what aesthetics as a subfield of 
philosophy has to offer. The other is to stimulate new work in this 
area of research. In this brief paper I’d like to say a bit more about 
this second objective. Current research is rarely conducted or 
communicated in the form of conversations, so the question arises: 
how can a book like mine fit with and feed into a research culture 
which is very much dominated by the format of the journal article?  
The first thing to note is that, despite the obvious differences 
in presentation, there are also strong similarities between the 
discussions that take place in philosophy journals and the 
discussions laid down in my book. The same basic sequence—X 
defends a claim, Y formulates objections, X responds to objections—
is really at the heart of both. Moreover, it’s not too much of a stretch 
to see the debates that take place in philosophy journals as ongoing 
conversations between scholars. Looked at it this way, it is not the 
incongruity but precisely the continuity between the two formats 
that appears striking. In addition, the conversational format has 
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some distinct advantages over the more familiar format of the 
journal article. I’d like to highlight six ways in particular in which this 
collection could prove a unique and useful resource for further 
research. 
First, in today’s academic culture where scholars are 
prompted to publish separate essays, rather than present grand 
philosophical systems, it is easy to lose sight of the underlying ideas 
and overarching themes that hold their work together. The 
conversation format has made it possible for me to ask authors 
directly about the overall coherence of their work. And some of the 
answers I received were surprising. Levinson, for instance, begins by 
saying that contextualism—the idea that the context of creation is 
crucial in determining the identity, art status, and meaning of a work 
of art—is the central thread running through his work. But when I 
ask him what distinguishes his views from other contextualist views, 
he mentions how he tends to foreground experience and value more 
than other analytic aestheticians—a response I had not anticipated 
given that Levinson is probably best known for essays that barely 
touch upon issues relating to experience and value (such as ‘What a 
Musical Work Is’ 1  and ‘Defining Art Historically’ 2 ). Another 
interesting contrast comes up in my conversation with Guyer, who 
has devoted much of his career to the study of one of the most 
systematic thinkers in history, Immanuel Kant, but who reveals that 
he has not attempted to make a systematic contribution to 
contemporary aesthetics himself and that he is in fact a strong 
supporter of non-reductionist, pluralistic theories of aesthetic value. 
When I met up with Carroll and Danto, I put the question to them in 
 
1 Levinson 1980. 
2 Levinson 1979. 
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terms borrowed from Isaiah Berlin's famous essay ‘The Hedgehog 
and the Fox’3, which divides thinkers into two categories. Hedgehogs 
relate everything to a single, universal principle, whereas foxes rely 
on multiple experiences and entertain a vast variety of ideas without 
seeking to fit them all into, or exclude them from, any one grand 
system. But while one might expect Danto to own up to being a 
hedgehog and Carroll to being a fox, they both resist this easy 
categorisation and go on to explain why their work cannot be 
pigeon-holed in any straightforward way.  
Incidentally, the more holistic approach of these 
conversations not only allowed me to probe the overall coherence of 
an author’s work, but also to bring to light certain tensions or 
inconsistencies in their thinking.  This is nowhere more evident than 
in my conversation with Danto. For example, while Danto is 
adamant that beauty is as obvious as blue and that we spot it 
immediately when it is present in a work, he also recounts in some 
detail how he came to appreciate the beauty of Bernini’s ‘Santa 
Teresa’ only very gradually.  Or consider the idea that art does not 
always have to be beautiful. On the one hand, Danto calls this one of 
the great conceptual clarifications of the twentieth century. On the 
other hand, he also acknowledges that a lot of medieval art is not, 
and was not meant to be beautiful. From a methodological 
perspective, readers may find it amusing to see how, after faulting 
Wollheim for refusing to go along with an argument from 
indiscernibles, Danto himself manifests a similar reluctance when I 
invite him to think about a painting that would be indiscernible from 
Motherwell’s ‘Elegy to the Spanish Republic’. 
Second, all of my conversation partners have left their mark 
 
3 Berlin 1953. 
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on philosophy of art and aesthetics, but some of them have also done 
significant work in other areas of philosophy (or outside of 
philosophy). This work is not always acknowledged in the 
professional journals of our discipline. So I have taken the 
opportunity in this book to ask them about some of their other 
writings. Scruton, for example, is a notable conservative philosopher 
and talking to him about the possible connections between his social 
and political reflections and his academic work in aesthetics was 
quite instructive. In my encounter with Carroll we briefly discussed 
his experience as a critic and screenwriter as well as his book on 
Buster Keaton.4 And I begin my conversation with Levinson with 
some reflections on his not-too-well-known essay on sexual 
perversion.5   
 Third, in research articles there is seldom room to elaborate 
on the provenance of one’s theories, even though knowledge of the 
early influences on an author is often helpful in understanding the 
views they ultimately arrive at. So, I hope the reader will find it as 
illuminating as I did to hear how, say, Currie was influenced by Imre 
Lakatos, David Lewis, David Armstrong and later on by Walton and 
Levinson. Or how Stanley Cavell’s teaching and thinking had a lasting 
impact on Guyer. The book may throw up some further surprises in 
this respect: Robinson, who is perhaps the most scientifically 
oriented of all the philosophers I spoke with, acknowledges her debt 
to F.R. Leavis, the literary scholar who was notoriously dismissive of 
science in the so-called ‘two cultures’ debate. Carroll, who has been a 
vocal critic of some French philosophy in the past, talks about the 
influence that the French phenomenologist, Merleau‑Ponty had on 
 
4 Carroll 2007. 
5 Levinson 2003. 
  Hans Maes 
 
126 
 
him when he was writing his Ph.D. And although twentieth century 
philosopher Nelson Goodman is no longer the central figure in 
aesthetics he once was, it is intriguing to see how his name still pops 
up in half of the conversations in this volume. Equally intriguing, I 
should say, are the passages where authors reveal how some of their 
ideas were not so much influenced but definitely anticipated by 
others. For instance, it turns out that one of Guyer’s key insights 
about the relation between analysis and psychology in aesthetic 
theory can also be found in the work of a now largely forgotten 
female philosopher, Ethel Puffer. Walton, on his part, even admits to 
being beaten to the punch by a fictional character. 
Fourth, what authors do not write about can potentially be as 
revealing as what they do end up writing about. Hence in some of my 
conversations I have tried to address what might be considered blind 
spots in the author’s oeuvre. With Korsmeyer that meant talking 
about the definition of art; with Danto and Levinson it meant talking 
about the aesthetics of nature; and with Walton I spoke about 
architecture and dance. Furthermore, the conversational format gave 
me a chance to query not just individual omissions, but also lacunae 
in the discipline as a whole. For instance, if you look at the leading 
aesthetics journals you will find many essays on beauty in art and 
nature, but very few that deal with the beauty of human beings 
(notwithstanding the fact that outside of academia the term 
‘aesthetics’ is most commonly used to refer to cosmetics, beauty 
treatments, and bodybuilding). Why is that? Or why has so much 
been written about particular art forms, especially music, and 
virtually nothing about other art forms such as sculpture? And what 
about philosophical texts or philosophers of the past who have fallen 
into obscurity? As I put the question to Guyer, might there be any 
hidden gems out there just waiting to be rediscovered?   
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 Fifth, collecting the answers of ten leading philosophers in 
one volume allows one to develop the sort of overview that can be 
hard to maintain given the constant stream of research articles. And 
that in turn can bring to light various unsuspected contrasts and 
convergences between these philosophers. Danto and Scruton, for 
example, could not be further apart in their appreciation of 
contemporary art (one considers Warhol’s Brillo Boxes a work of 
genius, the other dismisses it as a corny joke). But it turns out they do 
share a strong scepticism regarding the academic professionalisation 
of philosophy and the relevance of science for aesthetics. Conversely, 
Robinson and Currie are both eager to forge closer links between 
scientific and philosophical investigations, but they are increasingly 
at odds, so it transpires, about the cognitive value of art and 
literature.  
Where possible I have asked authors to comment directly on 
some of the disagreements that emerged. So, I asked Scruton what he 
thinks about Danto’s idea that Warhol’s Brillo Boxes are the 
culmination of the history of art and I asked Robinson what she 
thinks about Currie’s reasons for doubting that we learn anything 
significant from the novels she so admires. I also asked Robinson to 
comment on her disagreement with Korsmeyer regarding the notion 
of aesthetic disgust and her differences with Levinson regarding 
musical expressiveness.  
In gaining a sense of where these prominent figures stand on 
important issues, one also gets a better idea of the direction in which 
the discipline is headed. Take the question that is often assumed to 
be at the very heart of what analytic philosophy of art is about: the 
question of the definition of art. In reading these conversations it 
becomes abundantly clear that the question has lost much of its 
urgency and importance in recent years. Many of the philosophers I 
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spoke with simply declare to have no interest in the topic and even 
those who have written extensively about it in the past, like Levinson 
and Danto, exhibit an unmistakable weariness when the subject is 
broached. Questions around aesthetic and artistic value, by contrast, 
have become much more central now. And readers of this book will 
be able to track exactly how the battle lines are drawn in discussions 
about value (with pluralists, such as Carroll and Guyer, pitted against 
monistic theories of different stripes, including cognitivism, 
championed by Robinson and Freeland, and aestheticism, 
championed by Scruton). 
  This brings us to the sixth and last advantage, namely that 
these conversations present an excellent occasion to reflect on the 
discipline of aesthetics itself—something for which the main 
research journals do not always allow space. What are the future 
challenges and opportunities for the discipline? Is there genuine 
progress in philosophy in general and in aesthetics in particular? 
(Most of my conversation partners believe that there is, though 
Korsmeyer and Freeland offer some caveats.) Does one need to study 
the history of aesthetics if one wants to do research in this area? 
Where do the analytic and continental approaches differ most and is 
there a possibility of mutual enrichment? (Almost everyone thinks 
the latter is the case, though there is also the acknowledgement that 
the divide may have widened in recent years.) How important is style 
in philosophy and does writing about aesthetics itself need to be 
aesthetically rewarding? Can aesthetics be relevant for art practice? 
(Carroll and Danto believe so, but Levinson and Guyer are not so 
sure.) How, if at all, can aesthetics benefit from current scientific 
research? How promising are emerging subdisciplines such as 
experimental aesthetics and everyday aesthetics?  
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The answers to these questions, and to the other questions I 
raise, will help to paint a picture of the state of aesthetics today. And 
that picture, I would like to add in conclusion, is not at all a grim one. 
In fact, the opposite is true. The field is thriving and expanding, 
constantly producing new theories and charting unexplored 
territory: from the culinary arts to video games, from musical chills to 
3D cinema, from experimental aesthetics to aesthetic disgust. On the 
one hand, as you would expect from a flourishing field of study, 
research is becoming more and more specialised with increasingly 
sophisticated answers to the most fundamental questions as well as a 
growing body of work focusing on more and more specific topics. On 
the other hand, as I hope will be evident from this forthcoming 
collection, all this research activity has not made aesthetics into an 
esoteric or exclusive field of study, accessible only to a small elite of 
experts and isolated from other disciplines or from everyday 
concerns. To the contrary: aesthetics was and is a perfect ‘hub field’, 
as one of my conversation partners rightly pointed out. That is to say, 
it’s a central area from which you can do almost any kind of research 
in philosophy and which maintains close ties with cognate 
disciplines such as musicology, film theory, art history, psychology, 
and narratology. Moreover, since any credible philosophy of art and 
aesthetics must take its cues from our everyday engagement with 
aesthetic phenomena and works of art, esoteric tendencies have little 
chance to develop.  
So, if ‘Conversations on Art and Aesthetics’ can help to make 
our prospering and accessible branch of philosophy even more 
appealing to a wider audience, whilst also making a modest 
contribution to its research culture, I shall consider my time well 
spent.  
 
Postscript: There is one more advantage to this sort of project that I 
should mention: as early career philosophers know all too well, 
writing a philosophy dissertation or paper can sometimes be a lonely 
affair. The inner dialogue that we constantly engage in when we 
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consider potential objections and try to think of smart replies 
sometimes reminds me of the troubled and isolated Travis Bickle 
character in ‘Taxi Driver’ (“You talking to me? Well, I’m the only one 
here”) From that perspective, too, having more conversations with 
actual people might not be a bad thing.  
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